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Toward a Community of International
Judges
DANIEL TERRIS,* CESARE P.R. ROMANO, ** AND LEIGH SWIGART ***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, as new courts and tribunals with
regional or global jurisdiction have been established and become
operational, the group of individuals who have served as
international judges has expanded dramatically. International
judges are now hearing cases and making decisions in a number of
courts located in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. In the
process, they have developed international law at a rapid pace,
particularly in the domains of international criminal and human
rights law.
International judges are a diverse lot, hailing from many
countries around the globe, from a variety of professional
backgrounds, and from legal systems with different rules and
traditions. They also sit on courts with widely varying jurisdictions
and missions. Despite this heterogeneity, we contend that, taken
collectively, international judges comprise a community of
knowledge-based experts where similarities across the group are
more important than differences. These judges tend to share
similar backgrounds in terms of education and experience in the
international community, which has led to considerable harmony
in matters of judicial temperament, outlook, and style. A shared
understanding of the judicial function, and what it entails, binds
them together. And a common commitment to the aims of
international justice animates their growing sense of belonging to a
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single professional group. Their shared outlook, cutting across
many different courts, has led to mutual respect and deference,
and has made judges and courts more predictable and the
interpretation of law more stable than it might otherwise be.
The concept of a global community of judges is not new. A
number of legal scholars have written about the growing interest in
judicial dialogue and the use of jurisprudence across international
courts and between international and national courts.' Although
this community is not formally organized, there is a growing sense
among judges that they constitute a coherent professional group,
seeing one another "not only as servants and representatives of a
particular polity, but also as fellow professionals in a common
judicial enterprise that transcends national borders."2 Some
scholars are cautious about attributing too much to this loosely-
constructed community, suggesting that establishing more formal
procedures of dialogue might impede parochial tendencies in the
judicial profession.' Nevertheless, most observers agree that an
international judicial community already exists and is in the
process of becoming more defined.
This article builds on the various arguments that have been
.made for the existence of an international judicial community by
bringing in the voices of judges themselves. The research on which
this article is based indicates that international judges share a
common conception of what it means to deliver justice in
institutions that serve a population that stretches across political
borders and, in some cases, extends to the whole globe. This
common conception is still in formation, however, and it is clear
that international judges and the institutions in which they serve
1. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 191 (2003); Jenny S. Martinez, Toward an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429 (2003); William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Melissa A.
Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005); Laurence R. Heifer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107
YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF.
183, 187 (1997) (noting.that citing international decisions helps courts "gain legitimacy by
linking [themselves] to a larger community of courts"). For several excellent recent articles
on international judges, see Judging Judges, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., Dec. 2007, available
at http://www.ejls.eu.
2. Slaughter, A Global Community, supra note 1, at 193.
3. See Martinez, Toward an International Judicial System, supra note 1, at 434.
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face challenges of both a practical and ethical nature which courts
at the national level may not experience.
We also found that this community is neither uniform nor
necessarily benign. International judges can be parochial about
defending their turf, and there is a keen competition between
courts for attention and authority in an informal hierarchy of
international law. Furthermore, an overdeveloped sense of
community among judges has the potential to lead to a form of
"corporate solidarity" that could deflect constructive criticism and
stifle new thinking. These challenges may act as an impediment to
the formation of a collective identity in the international judiciary.
But they may also serve to underscore the particularities of the
work of international judges, thereby reinforcing their sense of
being engaged in an endeavor of unique importance.
This article is based upon research carried out between 2004
and 2006 on the international judiciary.4 The heart of our primary
research was a series of interviews, ranging from one to three
hours in length, with judges from the principal courts and tribunals
in the international system. These interviews covered a wide
variety of topics, including the judges' own backgrounds and
career developments, the process by which they were nominated
and elected or appointed to the court, the routine of their work,
their relationships among colleagues, their thoughts on key cases
decided by their courts, the ways judgments are crafted, the
4. The findings of this research served as the basis for our book, DANIEL TERRIS,
CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES (2007).
This article is largely drawn from that work.
5. There is no clear-cut, universally accepted definition of an international court.
Five basic elements, however, characterize the international courts and tribunals that have
the broadest and most sustained impact. Those courts: (1) are permanent, or at least long-
standing; (2) have been established by an international legal instrument; (3) use
international law to decide cases; (4) decide cases on the basis of rules of procedure which
pre-exist the case and usually cannot be modified by the parties; and (5) issue judgments
that are legally binding on the parties to the dispute. In 2006, thirteen courts met these
criteria, and operated with a certain regularity: the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
International Criminal Court (ICC), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR),
World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB), Court of Justice of the European
Communities, along with the Court of First Instance (ECJ), European Free. Trade
Agreement Court of Justice (EFTA Court), Court of Justice of the Andean Community
(ACJ), and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). It is the judges of these courts who were
the subjects of our research.
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relationship between law and politics, and issues of character and
ethics. Most of our interviewees were sitting judges at the time that
we spoke with them. Our sample of thirty-two judges represents
approximately one out of every seven sitting international judges.
We also spoke on a less formal basis with a variety of other people
observing international judges, including individuals who plead
before them and work with them out of such offices as the registry
and the office of the prosecutor.
This article will begin by providing the reader with a
"snapshot" of the international judiciary, as it existed in January
2006, near the end of our research period. Subsequent parts of the
article will discuss the ways in which international judges are
beginning to form a recognizable professional group, in terms of
their judicial culture, use of language, and interactions across
courts through shared and borrowed legal thinking. We will also
discuss the challenges that this community faces, both from
external entities and from within its own ranks. We will show that
international judges, perhaps against the odds, are beginning to
coalesce into a professional group with a characteristic and
increasingly uniform approach to the work of international justice,
although the success of this community is far from guaranteed.
Throughout the article, the words of our interviewees will be used
to illustrate various points and to provide the reader with an
insider's view of the experience of international judges.6
II. WHO ARE TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL JUDGES?
Today's international judiciary appears, at first glance, to be a
very diverse group. Judges hail not only from different nations, but
they also represent diversity through their ethnicity, legal training,
professional background and experience, and language skills. Yet,
a closer examination reveals patterns and similarities that go
beyond the common garb of the judicial robes.' Despite their
6. Most of the judges we interviewed have been quoted here without attribution, per
our agreement, as detailed on pages xvi-xvii in THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE. TERRIS,
ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4. The excerpts in this article that are attributed to
particular judges are drawn from interviews of those who agreed to be the subject of
individual profiles in the book.
7. Of the courts considered here, only a few provide on their websites
comprehensive biographical information on their judges, including name, nationality, date
of birth, education, career background, publications, and extracurricular activities. The
most detailed information can be found on the websites of the ICJ, ITLOS, and the WTO
AB. A notch below the level of detail of these is the ICC, and sparser still are the
[Vol. 30:419422
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differences, the men and women on the international bench
embody patterns of education and experience that have the
potential to form the basis of a global community.
A. Where Do They Hail From?
In January 2006, the date of our international judicial
snapshot, 215 men and women were serving as permanent
members of the bench of the thirteen major international courts
and tribunals. They hailed from eighty-six different countries from
every inhabited corner of the globe.' By region, Europeans were
dominant, with nearly two-thirds of the group (137). The United
Kingdom had the highest number of nationals on international
benches (nine), followed by France, Italy, and Germany (seven
each). There were thirty-seven citizens of the Americas, including
three U.S. citizens;" twenty Africans; and five from the
Pacific/Oceania region. Asia, representing more than half of the
biographical profiles on the websites of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECJ, CCJ and IACHR.
The European Court of Human Rights started posting information on its judges only
recently. More information on the ECHR judges can be found only in the records of the
Council of Europe, which is hardly accessible to the public. The EFTA Court does not
post any judicial information on its website at all. International judges' biographies do not
provide any information on questions one might like to know about, like race, dual or
multiple nationalities, political orientation, or religion. These factors play a great role in
debates about judges in domestic courts but are absent internationally. At the
international level, concerns about diversity and representativeness tend to be couched in
terms of geographic diversity. Finally, there is no common format for biographies, making
comparison and aggregation of data particularly problematic. Hence, a group portrait of
international judges is necessarily sketchy and surely cannot claim absolute fidelity and
completeness. The information here has been compiled with data collected in January
2006 through the official websites of the thirteen courts listed above. See Excel
Spreadsheet, International Judges Data Spreadsheet (Jan. 2006) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter International Judges Data Spreadsheet].
8. Id.
9. Id. These figures do not take account of judges sitting only for a particular case
(i.e., ad litem judges at the ICTY and ICTR, alternate judges at the SCSL, ad hocjudges at
the ICJ or ITLOS, or panelists of the WTO panels). Id. The figures also do not include the
advocates general at the European Court of Justice, who have the status of judges, but
who do not take part in deliberations (eight). Id. In January 2006, the number of
permanent members of the thirteen major courts was as follows: ECHR (forty-five); ECJ
(twenty-five); CFI (twenty-five); ICTY/ICTR (twenty-five); ITLOS (twenty-one); ICC
(eighteen); ICJ (fifteen); SCSL (eleven); CCJ (seven); IACHR (seven); WTO AB (seven);
EFTA Court (three); ACJ (five). Id. Note that, in April 2006, Venezuela announced the
intention to withdraw from the Andean Community and, therefore, at the time of this
writing there was no Venezuelan judge at the Andean Court of Justice, bringing the total
for that court down to four judges. Id.
10. They were Thomas Buergenthal at the ICJ, Theodor Meron at the ICTY and
Merit Janow at the WTO AB. Id.
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world's total population, comprised just under eight percent of the
judges on these courts (sixteen).
These considerable variations across the globe derive
principally from whether or not states are inclined to create and
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of international courts. The
judicial pillars of the European area alone employ ninety-nine
judges," a reflection of the continent's historical leadership and
commitment to the development of transnational legal institutions.
The Asian nations, by contrast, have not created regional courts to
address economic or human rights issues, so their presence on the
international bench is limited to courts with global representation.
Africa's share would be larger if the survey included the judges of
the several dormant or not yet active international courts on that
continent.
B. Education
One of the distinguishing features of the international courts
is the challenge of melding the two main legal systems of the
world: the civil law system (essentially the legal system of the
Roman Empire), and the common law system (developed first in
England and spread around the world through the British
Empire). Of the 215 judges serving in January 2006, sixty-three
percent (136) were from civil law countries, a figure that reflects
the large number from continental Europe.'2 Another fourteen
percent (30) hailed from common law countries, such as the
United Kingdom or the United States." The remaining forty-nine
judges came from countries that have either a mix of the common
law and civil law systems (such as Cyprus or South Africa), or have
Islamic law and/or local customary law blended to varying degrees
with either civil law (e.g., Tunisia) or common law (e.g.,
Pakistan)."
Typically, international judges have studied law in the leading
universities of their native countries. While their legal training
would have focused initially on their own country's domestic law,
many also studied international law, which is neither common law,
nor civil law, nor a blend of the two -it is a system of law unto
11. The ECJ together with its Court of First Instance (fifty), the EFTA Court (three),
and the ECHR (forty-six). Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
424 [Vol. 30:419
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itself. Only a small number of the 215 judges did not have a formal
law degree, and most of those had studied international law in an
academic program outside of a law school, such as a program in
international relations or political science.5
The large majority of international judges also have graduate
or doctoral degrees, most typically in international law,
international relations, and/or international economics.'6 In many
instances, these advanced degrees have been obtained abroad,
from a handful of the world's elite universities. Using data as of
January 2006, at least thirty-nine had degrees from universities in
the United Kingdom and at least twenty-nine from" institutions in
the United States,'7 a fact that suggests that many of those from
civil law countries gained direct knowledge and experience of the
common law outlook at some point in their training. The world's
most prestigious schools could boast of several international
judges among their alumni: in the United States, Columbia and
Harvard had seven each, well ahead of the next, Yale, with three.8
In the United Kingdom, Cambridge and the University of London
topped the charts with fourteen and eleven respectively, ahead of
Oxford with eight. 9 In France, the University of Paris (in its
various articulations) had the lion's share, with eleven alumni
serving in international courts. 2' Among judges from countries that
used to be in the Soviet sphere of influence, many studied at the
University of Moscow or other top schools in former Eastern bloc
countries.
15. Id. Of the 215 judges sitting in January 2006, only one did not have a degree either
in law or international relations: Arumugamangalam Ganesan, member of the WTO AB,
who has an M.A. and M.Sc. in chemistry (University of Madras, India) but no law or
international law degree. He has gained his experience and knowledge of the legal aspects
of international relations instead through a life in national and international civil service.
Id.
16. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 18.
17. International Judges Data Spreadsheet, supra note 7. Complete information on
educational backgrounds is not available for all of the judges.
18. Some have degrees from multiple institutions. Other U.S. schools where
international judges studied are: NYU (three), UC Berkeley (two), U. Illinois (Chicago)
(two), Notre Dame (one), St. Johns' NY (one), Tufts (one), UCLA (one) New School
(one), U. Michigan (one), Bethany College (one), Cornell (one), Duke (one), Georgetown
(one). Id.
19. Others are Edinburgh U. (two), London School of Economics (two), Glasgow U.
(one), King's College (two), Kent at Canterbury (one), Nottingham (one), Leeds (one),
Newcastle (one). Several did their barrister training at Gray's Inn. Id.
20. Others are the Ecole Nationale d'Administration-NA (three), Strasbourg
(two), Aix-Marseilles (one), Nancy (one). Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Judge Thomas Buergenthal of the International Court of
Justice offered this comment about the significance of a common
educational experience among members of the international
judiciary:
The question I get very often, and what I think the public
should know, is that what unites international court judges is
the fact that we are trained in the international legal system.
Contrary to what some people believe, international law is a
distinct legal system not unlike the civil law or common law
system. That is, we share a common theoretical approach to the
legal problems before us. In our analysis of a legal problem, we
draw on the doctrines and methodologies of the international
legal system. That unites us, regardless of where we judges
come from. Moreover, most of my colleagues have studied
international law not only in their countries but also in the
major teaching centers of our field in the world. That, too, is a
unifying factor."
The fact that most judges have degrees from a handful of the
world's elite schools means that, at least in large courts, it is not
uncommon to find at least two judges who have studied in the
same institution. It also means that a significant part of the
international judiciary studied largely with the same professors,
and in many cases, even the same textbooks. This similar
education experience is one of the factors that create a sense of
membership in a specialized and distinct professional group. Still,
international judges have an educational background much more
heterogeneous than that found among judges of most national high
courts. As a comparison, five out of nine U.S. Supreme Court
justices of the current bench (2006), studied law at Harvard, two at
Yale and the remaining two at Northwestern and Columbia.
C. Gender
While the ranks of the international judiciary represent
individuals from many different backgrounds, this diversity does
not extend to gender. Women are absent from, or under-
represented, in all of the courts considered here, although in the
past few years the situation has slowly started to improve. Just
twenty-one percent (forty-five) of the judges on the thirteen courts
21. Interview with Judge Thomas Buergenthal, I.C.J. (Apr. 28 2005) [hereinafter
Buergenthal Interview] (on file with law review).
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were women in January 2006.22 Nearly a decade after its formation,
no woman had ever served among the twenty-one members of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. There was only one
woman on the International Court of Justice; she was elected in
1995 and was the first to be elected in the court's forty-nine year
history.23 The first woman to be elected to the WTO Appellate
Body was Merit Janow in 2003, who has since been replaced by
Jennifer Hillman.24
The European Court of Justice had two women judges among
its twenty-five members,5 but its Court of First Instance, a more
"junior" group, had a more balanced group of nine women out of
twenty-five on its bench.26 Comparatively, the Andean Court of
Justice and the Caribbean Court of Justice had a greater ratio of
female representation with one woman each out of, respectively,
four and seven judges.27
Women tend to be slightly better represented in the case of
human rights and humanitarian law bodies, but there are
significant differences from body to body and region to region. At
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cecilia Medina
Quiroga, the only female judge in 2006, was only the second
woman in its twenty-five year history ever to serve on the court."
The European Court of Human Rights showed more balance, but
it did not come close to gender equality (twelve female judges out
of forty-five). 9 On the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the
number of women judges remained low. Out of nine trial judges
there was one woman at the ICTY, and three at the ICTR. In the
Appeals Chamber, shared by the two tribunals, there were two
women judges out of seven." The Special Court for Sierra Leone
had three women judges out of ten.'
22. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 18.
23. It is noteworthy, however, that this judge, Rosalyn Higgins, was elected president
of the ICJ by her peers in February 2006. Two ad hoc female judges are Susanne Bastid
and Christine Van den Wyngaert.
24. A second woman, Lilia R. Bautista of the Philippines, was appointed in 2007.
25. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 19.
26. Id.
27. Judge Olga Navarrete Barrero was the President of the Andean Court of Justice
at the time of this writing.
28. The first was Sonia Picado Sotela, who served from 1989-1994. Medina Quiroga
was elected president of the court in fall 2007.
29. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 19.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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A striking exception in January 2006 was the strong
representation of women on the International Criminal Court
(seven of eighteen members). At the Rome Conference that gave
birth to the ICC in 1998, delegates noted the scarce presence of
women in the ad hoc tribunals and the excellent performance of
those few who had served there.32 Lobbying by non-governmental
organizations and the support of sympathetic states helped bring
about the article in the Rome Statute that required states to take
into account the "fair representation of women" when choosing
the court's judges.3 At the time of the first and second elections of
the judges, several NGOs made extensive efforts to bring forward
the names of women who met the election requirements,
particularly from those countries that had little diplomatic
leverage to get one of their nationals elected.' Once nominated,
NGOs vigorously lobbied states to elect them, which eventually
resulted in an international bench with the highest female
participation of all international courts, with women making up
more than one-third of the bench."
Some observers have raised questions about the need for
gender parity on courts. Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga, current
president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
responded:
Well, if you ask me if it is important to have women, just
women, I would say, "Yes," because it shows that equality is
respected. Why on earth not have women if we are half of the
world? So it is important from a symbolic point of view for
women to see other women on the court. And it is important
for democracy, because it shows that women are not
discriminated against. But it is also important in the sense of
making progress for women's rights. For this, you not only need
a woman on the court, you need one who is sensitive to the
problems of being a woman and who is sensitive to doing
32. Id.
33. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36.8, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
34. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 19.
35. In addition to having a high percentage of female judges, the ICC also had the
only openly gay judge on an international court. Adrian Fulford, Gay Power: The Pink
List, THE INDEPENDENT, July 2, 2006, hitp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-
britain/gay-power-the-pink-list-406297.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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whatever it takes to make people see that some of the situations
that women undergo are actually violations of human rights.36
D. Professional Background
It is difficult to provide reliable aggregate data about the
professional background of international judges. As they are
invariably people with several decades of work experience, many
have changed careers and have lengthy curricula. Few can be
clearly labeled as belonging to a particular profession. A rich and
diversified career seems to be the one trait common to most
international judges.
International judges have principally had three kinds of
careers: the national judiciary, academia. or civil service (either in
an international organization or in the service of one's own
government, in a variety of capacities, including diplomacy). Some
have had significant legal practice as private attorneys, rising to the
top of their respective law firms. A few might even have had
political experience, but it is rare that career politicians become
members of the international judiciary.37 Again, the blend varies
36. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 186. From an interview recorded
on September 24, 2006.
37. There are exceptions. At the ICJ, Pieter Hendrik Kooijmans was Foreign
Minister of the Netherlands from 1993-1994. He was also Vice Chairman of the Dutch
Evangelical Party (merged in 1980 with two other parties into the Christian Democratic
Party), and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Christian Democratic
Party. At ITLOS, Jean-Pierre Cot was a member of the European Parliament (1978-1979
and 1984-1999), President of the Budget Committee of the European Parliament (1984-
1989), President of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament (1989-1994), Vice-
President of the European Parliament (1997-1999). At the ICTY/ICTR, Mohamed
Shahabuddeen was First Deputy Prime Minister and Vice-President, Guyana (1983-1987).
At the ICTR, Jai Ram Reddy was a member of the House of Representatives and Leader
of the Opposition in the Fijian Parliament (1977-1984, 1992-1999). At the ICC, Karl T.
Hudson-Phillips was a member of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago (1966-1976);
Elizabeth Odio Benito was Minister of Justice, and once a candidate for Prime Minister of
Costa Rica. At the ECHR, Volodymyr Butkevych was a member of the Ukrainian
Parliament; Andras Baka was a member of the Hungarian Parliament (May 1990-April
1991) and Deputy Chairperson of the National Assembly (1991-1994); Antonella
Mularoni has been a member of the Grand and General Council of the Republic of San
Marino since May 1993. At the ECJ, Antonio Mario La Pergola was elected to the
European Parliament (1989-1994). At CFI, Irena Pelikanova was a member of the
Legislative Council of the Government of the Czech Republic (1998-2004); Ingrida
Labucka was a member of Parliament (2002-2004). At the IACHR, Sergio Garcia-
Ramirez was a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (since 1961) and
occupied different positions under the PRI regime, and served in the cabinet of President
Jos6 L6pez Portillo as Secretary of Labor and then in the cabinet of President Miguel de la
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
from court to court, and it is not uncommon for some judges to
have had more than one of these careers.
To provide some approximate figures, grosso modo: out of
215 judges, one can count about eighty-five who have significant
academic credentials (tenured or associate, but not counting
visiting and adjunct positions); seventy who can claim to be
professional national judges; and about sixty who mostly had a
career as civil servants." This last figure can be broken down
further: about forty served in international organizations and
approximately twenty for their own government." Finally, about
ten can be labeled as practicing attorneys.
While none of the three principal careers (judge, academia, or
civil service) provides a clear majority of judges in any particular
court, some seem to provide a generally larger share of
international judges than others. In the early days of international
dispute settlement, most judges and arbitrators were drawn from
the halls of universities. " Because of their profession, international
law professors were likely to have written a fundamental opus on a
relevant topic, and their former students had often moved onto
becoming legal advisers and diplomats for countries or
organizations. In recent years, however, it seems academics have
been losing their edge, if not in absolute numbers, then at least in
relation to the other recruitment pools that have widened. As
governments grow increasingly concerned about judicial activism,
an extensive record of publication may provide the basis of
opposition to an academic's candidacy for the position of an
international judge."
Especially since the advent Of international criminal tribunals,
the number of national judges serving on international benches has
considerably increased.42 Courtroom management skills are a
valuable asset when handling criminal trials, especially high-profile
ones, so it should be no surprise that the statute of the ICC tends
to favor those with competence in criminal law and procedure, as
well as the necessary relevant experience as judge, prosecutor, or
Madrid as Attorney General. In 1988, he lost the PRI internal bid for the party
presidential candidacy against Carlos Salinas de Gortari.
38. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 20.
39. This last distinction is particularly imprecise as often someone might serve in an
international organization on behalf of his own government.
40. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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advocate in criminal proceedings. The statute provides that the
bench will have no fewer than nine judges with this type of
experience on a bench of eighteen. 3 Those with expertise in
relevant areas of international law such as international
humanitarian law, and experience in a professional legal capacity
that is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court, have only five
"reserved" seats." In adopting this balance, negotiators of the ICC
statute were probably taking into account the criticism that the
first benches of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals were too
"academic" and, therefore, responsible for the slow pace of the
courts' first trials.
Civil service, whether for a national government or an
international organization, is another principal recruitment pool."
Legal advisors of an international organization to which the court
is attached occasionally make the transition to the bench: Allan
Rosas, currently judge of the ECJ, was previously the principal
legal adviser of the European Commission. 6 It is not uncommon to
find on the bench of newly created international courts some of
the diplomats who negotiated its creation. For example, a large
number of the judges of the ITLOS were at some point involved in
the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Law of the Sea
Convention. 7 The same is true in the case of some judges of the
International Criminal Court, whose president, Philippe Kirsch, a
Canadian diplomat by background, was a principal figure in the
Rome Conference that created the court. ' Having reached the
apex of service domestically or internationally, a civil servant can
end his career in a very dignified way by serving as an
international judge. Because of their connections both within their
countries and in the international community, many senior
diplomats have an inside track in both the nomination and election
processes.
This description of the international judiciary illustrates that
the benches of international courts are more heterogeneous than
those of their national counterparts. This is simultaneously their
43. Rome Statute, supra note 33, at art. 36.3.
44. Id. at art. 36.5.
45. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 21.
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greatest weakness and greatest strength. It is a weakness because
great efforts have to be made in order to bridge differences among
judges. It is a strength because this same heterogeneity provides a
range of skills, competences and backgrounds much wider than
any domestic court could ever exhibit-a range which is necessary
to tackle the kind of problems international courts deal with on a
daily basis. To be effective, the bench of an international court
needs to achieve a balance between prioritizing collective
endeavors and appreciating and benefiting from individual
diversity.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL CULTURE
It might seem that achieving such a balance is nearly
impossible, but it is clear that international courts are, in fact,
relatively successful at doing just this. Working as an international
judge can create a powerful common mindset. The members of
this community tend to see each other not as servants or
representatives of a particular polity, but instead as fellow
professionals in a common judicial enterprise that transcends
national borders. They are bound together because they face
common substantive and institutional problems; they pay attention
to one another's judgments beyond what might formally be
mandated by any legal principle or judicial structures; and they
learn from one another's experience and reasoning." All of these
connections contribute to the emergence of an international
judicial culture.
But how can such a common culture develop in this context of
vast individual diversity? Why is there not a continual clash of
ideas and understandings? In the judicial institutions studied here,
tensions related to different worldviews inevitably arise, not only
inside the courts themselves, which are characterized by alliances
and hierarchies like other large institutions, but also in relation to
the work they perform and the constituencies they serve. It can be
observed, however, that within these tensions, there exists an
enormous potential for forging new and powerful collective
approaches to justice that can still honor the multiplicity of
cultural understandings found both inside the courts and around
the world at large.
50. Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, supra note 1.
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International judges can be seen as forming what some social
scientists have termed an "epistemic community," that is to say, a
group of people who, while different in many regards, are
animated by common ideas, sets of values, or aims." Members of
an epistemic community are a "network of knowledge-based
experts," held together by the members' "shared belief or faith in
the verity and the applicability of particular forms of knowledge or
specific truths." 2 The judges who serve on international courts
share a belief in the aims of international justice and the value of
international law. This allows them to transcend personal
differences-or, very often, to use these personal differences-to
carry out the work of their institutions. 3
The development of this epistemic community-for, indeed, it
is still in a formative stage-is facilitated by certain pre-existing
similarities among international judges: the common patterns of
training and professional background explored above. Yet, despite
these patterns, the wide array of perspectives that judges bring to
bear on the work of an international court strikes a contrast with
work in a national context. One judge was surprised by the
difference. "I always thought that I understood international
organizations because I had worked with them a lot," he said, "but
I didn't. Being in one is completely different. You realize how
homogenous a government is, instinctively. A government is
basically monolithic, and people may have their differences, but
they don't challenge the basics. In an international organization,
everyone challenges the basics all the time.""
In many cases, judges see the mix of professional backgrounds
as an asset to their institutions. One European judge called it
[G]reat fun to work with people from very different
backgrounds-not just national backgrounds, but actually
almost more important here are the professional backgrounds
of the people. Professors tend to be interested in solving
juridical problems. Former administrators tend to be interested
51. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
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in getting a practical solution to work on the ground. Judges
tend to be preoccupied with getting through a caseload and not
keeping everyone waiting.5
There thus seems to be general agreement between judges
and observers that, because international courts are required to
tackle very different sets of international and transnational
problems, a bench with people from different backgrounds is a
crucial asset. Indeed, each of the three basic pools from which
candidates are drawn contributes uniquely to the blend. Diplomats
provide the understanding of the larger political framework within
which the case is embedded, as well as potential ramifications of
judgments. They are often those providing the essential reality
check in the deliberations. Academics are able to connect the
judgment to the larger construction of international law, providing
the formal correctness and consistency necessary to buttress the
legitimacy of the ruling. National judges know how to deliberate
and manage to reach consensus, how to run a courtroom, and how
to correctly assess evidence and give proper weight aid
consideration to both parties' arguments. Each group naturally has
weaknesses as well. Diplomats tend to be too deferential to
governmental and systemic interests, and often argue for the status
quo. Academics are often accused of being incapable of
participating in a consensus, of being too abstract and of being
"maximalists" who are disinclined to make the necessary
compromises of judicial work."' National judges might have too
little understanding and appreciation of international law and may
not be as worldly as those in the other groups.
The president of a criminal court painted a less rosy view of
the professional mix in his institution. "When you look at what the
judges actually were before," he said, "you see many differences.
Some are former international judges, some are former national
judges, some are former lawyers, some are former law professors,
and some are former diplomats. Well, you put that together, you
shake, and it explodes."57 Different backgrounds contribute
significantly to different practical approaches to problem-solving.
"I found the national judges extremely rigid in the way they were
approaching things," he continued, "and the diplomats tended to
55. Id.
56. Id.
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see everything like, 'This is something that should be fixed.'
Neither approach works. So, at the beginning, certainly, the
cultural differences based on all these different factors were very
pronounced. But, over time, I think there has really been a
tightening of the judicial culture here.""
Judges in international courts seem to be relatively successful
in creating a collective identity for themselves, one that allows
them to pull together and work toward a common goal. This is
very obvious in a court like the European Court of Justice, where
dissenting or separate opinions cannot be made. One ECJ member
remarked that
[A] judge coming from a national system who was appointed to
the court, and who continued to see everything in terms of his
own national legal system,* looking at it through "national
spectacles," would come up with a completely different
viewpoint on all of the questions. And if all the judges were free
to do that, then you would not actually manage to forge a
community rule at all. You would have a collection of national
viewpoints. The fact that the judges are obliged to pool their
perspectives, and obliged to reach some kind of common view,
is, I think, one of the main reasons why the court has
succeeded.
Several ECJ judges observed that not only is it possible for a
large group of judges from different professional, national, and
linguistic backgrounds to agree in the process of writing a
judgment, it is not even particularly difficult. This can perhaps be
explained by the fact that the judges appointed to the court have
already demonstrated that they have gone beyond a narrow
nationalism and participate in a larger European identity. Even for
a body like the International Criminal Court, with a virtually
worldwide jurisdiction and judges from around the globe, the.
mission of the institution seems to be so compelling that judges are
able to put aside their differences and, in the words of one ICC
judge, "start working together and reconcile their differences in
order to form a united approach to justice."'
This "united approach to justice"-the new judicial culture
that is beginning to characterize the international system-is
something that may not be familiar to new international judges. It
58. Id.
59. Id. at 65.
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is something that may very well have to be absorbed through
experience and learned by trial and error. And despite the
newness of this profession, there is little formalized training or
mentoring about the practical aspects of being an international
judge for those who are just coming onto the job. Novice judges
are mostly left alone to figure out how things work in their court,
posing questions to colleagues for clarification as they go. Only
one court seems to have made a more formal attempt to help
incoming judges learn the ropes of their institution-the creation
of a "godfather system" between new and experienced judges at
the European Court of Justice.61 But this scheme was, in the end,
more an idea than a reality. Several judges from various courts
noted that the support staff at their courts (experienced legal
officers and secretaries) were the most helpful in providing them
guidance upon their arrival and helping them to transition
smoothly onto the bench.62
International judges do not simply encounter a series of new
duties and procedures in joining a court, however.63 They also
become members of a complex community, made up of fellow
judges, support staff, and administrators. Across this spectrum,
judges inevitably end up allying themselves with like-minded
individuals, in both professional and social contexts. Some judges
confess to being drawn to colleagues with whom they share a
language or training. For others, worldview and ideology are more
significant as a foundation for friendship and collegiality. ."I think
there are natural alignments," commented one member of the
International Court of Justice,
[A]nd I don't think they are related to nationality, geography,
gender, or language. I really profoundly believe this from my
experience. It's just where your mindsets are similar. You have
similar views on important questions like ethics, and the right
way to go about things. You might expect it to be about
whether you are on the conservative or the liberal end of the
spectrum. But I don't believe it's any of the criteria you might
imagine.-
A European Court of Justice judge similarly noted that there
are some differences between judges who are more conservative
61. See id. at 57.
62. Id. at 65-66.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id.
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and those who are more liberal. "There are people who want to be
more cautious than others. But then, in my view, it's a sliding scale,
and somebody who might want to be very cautious in a certain
type of situation tends to be much more bold in other situations.
65
Thus, it is difficult to predict with whom judges will feel the most
solidarity or sympathy among the members of their bench.
International courts face an additional challenge unknown to
most national judiciaries: their benches are composed of judges
who have been trained in distinct legal traditions. Most judges
have either a common or civil law training, depending upon the
country where they studied. Countries of the post-colonial world
generally inherited the system of their colonizer; thus, judges from
the UK, Nigeria, St. Kitts and Nevis, and India will all have a
common law training, while their peers from France, Mali, Algeria,
and Vietnam will have a civil law training. In some countries,
judges might also use customary or Islamic law alongside common
or civil law. One might say that international judges have learned
to speak the language of law using not only different vocabularies
but also different grammars.
Judges necessarily bring their training with them to the courts
on which they serve. These courts have found various and unique
ways of blending the different systems, especially in terms of their
rules of procedure and evidence. As a judge of the European
Court of Justice explained, "European Union law is a kind of
mosaic system, a mixture of common law and continental
systems,"' and the same mosaic effect exists in all international
courts to a greater or lesser degree. On the Caribbean Court of
Justice, judges with a civil law perspective work in tandem with
experts in common law.67 One former clerk of the court said, "This
collaboration allows highly-accomplished judges to learn from
each other and benefit from each other's experiences."6 One judge
who was instrumental in the development of the rules of
procedure and evidence for the Yugoslavia tribunal described the
accomplishment of the first real code of criminal procedure on the
international level as,
[A] synthesis of three things. First, [it is] a synthesis between
the civil and the common law. And the statute was made on the
65. Id.
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basis of common law, but we managed to inject a good part of
civil law-at least permitting a more active role of the bench in
the cases. Secondly, we had to inject into it all the codes of
human rights that were developed in the UN. And then, thirdly,
we had to adapt it to the conditions of the international legal
system, which is a different environment, particularly in its
access to persons and to evidence and to territory. So, it was
very complicated!6 9
International judges disagree about how significant an impact
the different training of judges actually has on the work of their
courts. Many would agree that the impact is less about substantive
law and more about the habits and procedures that directly shape
the outlines of judicial work. It has been noted that common law
judges are clearly more comfortable with oral hearings than their
civil law peers. One member of the European Court of Justice
remarked on how this plays out in day-to-day work.
There is a different attitude among members of the court
toward hearings .... Some think that oral hearings are not very
important, because they have this notion that it is the court that
knows the law and there's no purpose in having a hearing.
Because we know the law. That's very much in the French legal
tradition. Why do we need the parties to come and tell us the
law? We don't have anything to gain by having to sit here for
three hours listening to the parties. And so you will see that
many times they will not even ask any questions. And then you
have other members who actually use hearings not only to
promote discussion of the facts but also to clarify some
elements of the law. I think it's a reflection of the nature of this
court where you have quite different legal traditions. It makes it
interesting, but sometimes it also creates certain tensions, this
different approach to defining judicial function and the search
for the legal truth."
Another ECJ judge observed that attorneys from civil law
countries are often stymied when asked by the bench to answer
questions extemporaneously, expecting to simply read their
statement aloud to the court." Barristers from common law
countries, on the other hand, are experienced with such requests
and handle them with great skill.
69. Id.
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The procedural differences between common and civil law
traditions become even more visible in the context of an
international criminal court. Civil law judges and attorneys may
not be familiar with the cross-examination of witnesses or the
notion of the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. Their common
law colleagues may find communication between judges and
counsel outside the formal setting of the courtroom to be not only
unfamiliar but also a breach of ethics. A common law judge on a
criminal tribunal admitted to discomfort with the role of written
evidence in trial proceedings, preferring the common law
insistence on oral testimony by witnesses:
The big fight is between written and oral evidence. [Civil law
judges] say a lot of things can come in by written evidence. You
don't have to have the person who saw it or heard it and that
sort of thing. Now, I do not feel myself capable of assessing a
written document by a presumed witness unless it's on its face
incredible or contradictory. But if somebody tells a straight
story and I never see the person or never have a chance to
cross-examine them, I don't feel that I can evaluate it. The civil
law folks say, well, you have juries, and those are lay people and
so that's why you need to have the actual witness, because they
are not capable of evaluating written evidence, but judges are.
Well, I think that's baloney! We are no more capable of looking
at a piece of paper and knowing whether it's truthful unless we
know a lot more about the situation in which it was written.72
But this same judge has experienced some of the civil law
procedures of the international court as liberating.
I especially liked the fact that, more so than in [common law
domestic] courtrooms, the rules permit the judges to ask
questions. Usually you try not to interrupt the flow of the
testimony, but as you listen to it, you're compiling in your own
mind what you think they haven't covered. And it's perfectly
allowable at the end of the testimony for the judges to ask those
questions. In several instances, I felt those questions were very
useful. And I felt like I was in the process, I was an active
player !73
The Rwanda tribunal also struggles with its mix of civil and
common law procedures." Some suggested' that certain common
72. Id. at 69.
73. Id. at 69-70.
74. Id. at 70.
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law procedures might even be considered the culprit when it
comes to the tribunal's long and drawn out trials. "I find the
common law approach struggles quite a bit about the admission of
documents," one judge noted with exasperation.
That's quite a waste of time, sometimes. There, I prefer the civil
law or mixed law approach, simply to say that we take it in as
much as possible and we weigh it on the merits at the end of the
day. In my courtroom, I deliberately try to avoid any procedural
discussions. Procedural discussions are just sand in the
machinery. The point is to get rid of the question, in a fair way,
balancing the interests, but not to allow discussions just for the
sake of it."
Georges Abi-Saab is a member of the World Trade
Organization Appellate Body and formerly served as an appeals
judge for the ICTY and an ad hoc judge for the ICJ. He considers
"the judicial function" to be one of the elemental notions that link
judges together from different kinds of courts. 6 He offers this
comment on the three courts on which he has served:
You can see that there is a great difference among those three
fora. But they have something in common: on whichever you
sit, you are exercising the same function, the judicial function.
The judicial function has its own requirements, and it is the
same everywhere. However, it is like living in different houses.
The rules of architecture are the same, but you feel the
environment is very different. That is the judicial policy that
varies from organ to organ. But judicial policy has to remain
within the parameters of the judicial function."
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY
Even if judges agree on the function they are to fulfill as
members of a bench, they may occasionally experience the
difficulties that come with working in groups that are linguistically
diverse. Having multilingual benches is of an undeniable benefit to
judicial institutions; it broadens the sources of jurisprudence that
judges can access and may provide important insights into the
interpretation of testimony, the legal traditions of different
countries, or the background of particular cases. But on an
75. Id.
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everyday level, working alongside speakers of different languages
also has the potential to impede the development of a sense of
community among international judges.
"Language issues bedevil all international courts!" declared a
judge of the ECHR.8 While he feels this is true for international
courts generally, it is particularly applicable to his own. With a
jurisdiction covering the forty-six states of the Council of Europe
and a judge representing each one of them, language problems are
perhaps particularly pronounced at the ECHR. Yet, all courts
experience to some degree the challenges that accompany the
linguistic diversity not only of its staff, but also of the parties
appearing before the court.
All languages are not equal, however. The most common
pattern followed by international courts, and historically by other
international institutions as well, is to elevate one or more
languages to the status of a "working language."79 All court
personnel are required to speak at least one working language, and
official documents are produced in only those languages. English
and French are the most common working languages, reflecting
the global predominance of the first in the contemporary world,
and the historic centrality of the second to the development of
international law and institutions. The ECHR pairs English and
French, as do all the United Nations courts. The International
Criminal Court has followed suit. The Rwanda tribunal has made
efforts to make Kinyarwanda, the language of most of the
Rwandan population, a quasi-working language of the court.
Courts with regional jurisdiction generally operate in the
languages that make sense in their geographic zone: the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights uses Spanish, with English
serving as a secondary language; the Serious Crimes Investigation
Unit in East Timor had English, Portuguese, Tetum and Bahasa
Indonesian as working languages, although English played a very
significant role among judges and staff; the Caribbean Court of
Justice has three official languages, English, French, and Dutch,
although the latter is little-used compared to the others; and the
African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights has adopted the
languages that have official status in the countries of the African
78. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 71.
79. Id. at 71-72.
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continent-English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic." Only one
court-the European Court of Justice-uses French as its sole
working language.8
The decreased role of the French language in international
courts parallels its declining importance on the world scene over
the past century. Although equal in status as a working language in
many courts, it is rarely spoken by as many judges or court staff as
English. This may leave the Francophones feeling frustrated or
marginalized, especially in courts where the Anglo-Saxon
presence-both linguistic and legal-is dominant. In a court like
the European Court of Human Rights, where most judges come
from countries where neither working language is spoken, English
is clearly the priority language to learn, despite the fact that the
court is located in Strasbourg, France. An ECHR judge
commented,
It's very frustrating when, like myself, you're coming here
trying to get your French up to the standard and every time you
open your mouth in French, someone responds in English. And
when you are in a deliberation and somebody is speaking in
English, hardly anyone is listening on the interpretation,
sometimes no one. But when someone is speaking in French,
then you will always see two, three, or four judges listening to
82the translation.
The dominance of English over French is also noted by judges
of the WTO Appellate Body, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and the
International Criminal Court, all of which use both as working
languages. One ICC judge observed that despite the possible
tension that could arise from this language "competition," the
court siaff does not necessarily divide up into Francophone and
Anglophone groups: "English obviously dominates here, as it
dominates any other international organization. The reason why
I've said there's no Anglophone group is that the English-speaking
world is no longer Anglo-Saxon-it's much bigger than that now."
Indeed, another ICC judge, noting that she and many other judges
speak English as a third or fourth or fifth language, claims that the
real language of the ICC is "broken English."83
80. These are also the official languages of the African Union, the establishing body
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This natural evolution toward a single working language in
courts may appear beneficial, as it might eventually reduce the
need for translation altogether, at least among judges. Many
judges point out, however, that those who have English as a native
language find themselves in an advantageous position in relation
to their peers. Only native speakers have the full range of lexicon
and usage that allows them to express complex legal ideas with the
greatest subtlety and skill. "If somebody from China takes the
floor in English," observed a judge of the Law of the Sea Tribunal,
"even if he is an expert and had been at the Law of the Sea
Conference, he will never leave the same impression from his ideas
as somebody whose mother tongue is English."' One judge from a
small country bemoaned the fact that he has never been able to
work in his native language at all, which he has experienced as a
great professional disadvantage. There is, however, clearly more to
being a judge than speaking a working language fluently, and this
should not be minimized. A judge whose native language is Arabic
noted:
There is always an advantage for someone who speaks his own
language, especially in law. I mean, I've spent my whole life
working in two languages that are not my own. And that's a
great handicap. I might have been much better had I been able
to use my own language! And even between the two foreign
ones, I get a little bit confused sometimes. So I think the
linguistic advantage is important. But it is overweighed
sometimes by the intellectual advantage. I mean, someone who
is not very articulate in a particular language ... still, if he has a
certain force of reasoning, he can impose his way in spite of this
small handicap. '
Despite the obvious primacy of English in most international
courts and tribunals, many judges concur that the ideal scenario is
for courts to have members who are proficient in multiple working
languages. Those with the greatest linguistic skills often end up
taking the lead in deliberations. A judge of the European Court of
Human Rights observed,
[P]eople who have facility in one or other or both of the
working languages-and by that I mean practically speaking
them like a native-have an enormous advantage. And I think
that their influence is proportionately increased in that regard.
84. Id. at 73.
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It's noticeable that at the top level of the court, the people are
multilingual."6
A judge of the International Court of Justice spoke
admiringly of colleagues whose knowledge of both English and
French is so impeccable that they can look at versions of court
judgments in both languages, see where the translators have not
quite gotten it right, and make an alternative suggestion for
phrasing or terminology. A judge on the Rwanda tribunal from an
English-speaking country discovered, upon taking up his post, that
speaking French would facilitate his work immensely. He
immediately undertook to study it, despite his already crushing
workload. Many international judges similarly add language study
to their already long list of professional activities, and often the
court administration facilitates such efforts. For example, the
Caribbean Court of Justice has instituted weekly Dutch classes
aimed at allowing members of the court to serve citizens of
Surinam with greater ease.
Several judges, and perhaps not surprisingly those who are
multilingual themselves, have suggested that candidates for the
position of international judge be evaluated, at least partially, on
their language skills. A member of the Rwanda tribunal bench,
who has neither French nor English as a native tongue, insisted on
the need for broad language competency:
We all speak with our accents, but judges should certainly be
fluent in at least one and, hopefully, in both languages of the
court. I think that what we should strive for in the future, at the
international level, is a situation where we have bilingual
judges. I speak English and French and I find that it is a huge
advantage.
A former Yugoslavia tribunal judge and native English
speaker suggested, as an alternative, that courts try to have more
bilingual legal assistants and other staff. That way, judges could be
assisted in their work on documents in languages that they do not
speak. An ICTY colleague-a non-native English-speaking
polyglot- argued, however, that asking for judicial candidates who
speak two working languages is not overly demanding, and noted
the disadvantages of depending on legal assistants for such
assistance: "When you have two languages only, you should select
86. Id. at 73-74.
87. Id. at 74.
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candidates who have at least a good basic knowledge of both,
otherwise it can't work. Sometimes, for judges who speak just one
language, I have the impression that they are maybe led to a
certain extent by their bilingual assistants."'
Despite recognizing the obvious advantages of international
courts having multilingual benches, many in the field of
international law fear that requiring extensive language skills for
the position of international judge would further limit an already
small pool of qualified potential candidates. Linguistic competence
tends to receive, in fact, only a cursory examination during the
election process for international judges. For the time being,
professional experience and legal knowledge seem to trump
linguistic skill as qualifications for the position of international
judge.'
Can a community of international judges be created if all its
members do not speak the same language? This is a challenge that
most national judiciaries do not have to face, since even the most
multilingual of countries tend to have a single official language
that serves as the medium of communication in a court. In the
international judicial system, the problems of communication
among speakers of different languages will probably be solved in
the same way it has in the domains of academia, scientific research,
and business. It will fall to non-native speakers of English to
master the global lingua franca if they are to keep in step with
their fellow judges and benefit from judicial dialogue.
V. JURISPRUDENTIAL DIALOGUE
One of the most important forms of dialogue that judges
engage in is the reading and sharing of each other's jurisprudence.
They pay attention not only to the jurisprudence of their own
court, but also to that of other courts. Since most courts are self-
contained worlds and have different jurisdictions (subject matter,
personal, geographic or otherwise), it is not often that judges have
a formal reason to consider one another's rulings. Yet, from time
to time, courts use rulings to engage in a sort of jurisprudential
dialogue. The dynamics of this dialogue are variable, but a few
patterns do exist. First, it seems to be far from egalitarian. There is
an informal and unconscious, but tangible, pecking order among
88. Id.
89. Id.
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international courts and tribunals. Some courts prefer talking-or
worse, lecturing-to listening. And when it comes to listening, the
level of attention depends on which court is doing the talking.'
Then, some courts have closer relationships than others,
which inevitably instigates more intense exchange. For instance,
the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are Siamese
twins, connected at the head, as they share the same appellate
chamber. The statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
specifies that the court "shall be guided by the decisions" of the
two tribunals.9" The International Criminal Court, once it starts to
issue decisions, will likely consider the rulings of the ad hoc
tribunals as well. The European Court of Justice and the Court of
the European Free Trade Agreement are also linked, as the
agreements creating the EFTA Court require it to follow the
jurisprudence of the ECJ.92 The ECJ and the European Court of
Human Rights, having some area of overlap, especially regarding
individual freedoms, are engaged in a regular dialogue.93 Their
judges meet once a year for an informal one-day seminar and brief
each other on pending cases that might be of mutual interest. The
ECHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights closely
read each other's judgments since both are involved in the
application of human rights conventions that contain many similar,
if not identical, provisions, although the massive case law of the
ECHR gives the Strasbourg court a louder voice than the one in
San Jos 4. 4
The role of precedent across international courts has not yet
been thoroughly studied, since only recently has the number of
international rulings of most courts become sizeable.'5 Of course,
policies (always tacit, never explicit) might vary from court to
court, and each judge might have a different attitude, but it seems
90. Nathan Miller, An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of "Precedent"
Across International Tribunals, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 483,489-90 (2002).
91. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 20(3), Jan. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uCIndlMJeEw=&tabid=200.
92. See generally Thordis Ingadottir, The EEA Agreement and Homogenous
Jurisprudence: The Two-Pillar Role Given to the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 2 Y.B. OF INT'L L. & JURIS. (2002).
93. See, e.g., Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1.
94. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 120.
95. See Miller, An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of "Precedent" Across
International Tribunals, supra note 90, at 483-526.
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that a few elements of a sort of "theory of precedent" aregradully . 96
gradually emerging.
First, no international judge seems to feel bound by the
jurisprudence of another court. This is unsurprising given the fact
that courts are not even formally bound by their own precedent,
are not hierarchically organized, and despite a few exceptions, are
self-contained jurisdictions. However, this also seems to stem from
a certain sense of pride and defense of one's own judicial turf.
Thus, jurisprudence of other courts is taken into consideration
only when one's own court has no useful precedents. Although
some judges might be more willing than others to cite, it is
generally done sparingly, selectively, and grudgingly. Relying too
much on other courts' jurisprudence is tantamount to abdicating
one's own role. As a veteran judge said, "Referring to and even
quoting a judgment of another court does not make it a formal
source. It is just as an example of one proposed solution, a solution
which was adopted by the colleagues of another international
court."97
Second, if, on a given point of law, judges of one court feel
differently than those of another court, out of judicial comity they
will simply omit to take cognizance of judgments that do not
support their reasoning. Citing to say "they got it wrong" is
generally avoided, even severely frowned upon.98 A judge of the
Sierra Leone court commented that in the case involving the
immunity of Charles Taylor,' a relevant ICJ case" was cited
96. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 120.
97. Id.
98. There are, however, some very notorious exceptions. For example, the ICTY
tribunal chastised the International Court of Justice in the decision of its appeals chamber
in the Tadic case. In its earlier Nicaragua case, the ICJ had to determine whether a foreign
state (the United States), because of its financing, organizing, training, equipping and
planning of the operations of organized military and paramilitary groups of Nicaraguan
rebels (the so-called contras) in Nicaragua, was responsible for violations of international
humanitarian law committed by those rebels. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). The ICJ held that a high degree
of control was necessary for this to be the case. It required that first, a party not only be in
effective control of a military or paramilitary group, but that also the control be exercised
with respect to the specific operation in the course of which breaches may have been
committed. In the Tadic appeal decision, the ICTY criticized the "Nicaragua test" as not
consonant with the logic of international law of state responsibility and at variance with
judicial and state practice. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Appeals Judgment, IT
116-145 (July 15, 1999).
99. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
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profusely, but "we did not follow it because one was able to
distinguish it. So that's how we proceed. We try to be independent
in our thinking without showing disregard to earlier thinking of the
other courts. We show them the utmost respect."' 1'
Third, the formal nature of a judicial finding does not matter.
Judges consider decisions of other international courts regardless
of whether they are final or preliminary judgments, orders, non-
binding advisory opinions or anything else. What they look at is
the jurisprudence rather than any specific case, and what
ultimately seems to matter is only that the reasoning that led the
other tribunal to a given conclusion is legally sound and
persuasive. As one judge admitted, "I'm not certain that there is
much great practical difference between a decision that is binding,
and one that is not binding but persuasive. ' '1.2
In the judges' minds, international courts seem to be divided
between generalized (like the ICJ) and specialized (all others), and
between regional courts and the so-called "universal courts,"
whose jurisdiction is not restricted to any particular geographic
area. This means that specialized courts will consider, quote, and
defer to the ICJ on matters of general public international law. As
a WTO Appellate Body member admitted, "I think we would
never take on the ICJ. Whenever there is a reference, it is a
reference as an authority."'0 3 Arguably, this should also imply that
the ICJ will defer to specialized tribunals with special knowledge
or competence on certain matters, but to date, no such case has
arisen.
Fifth, "universal" courts might consider, but will refrain from
quoting, regional courts. This is because of the need not to
attribute particular value to the jurisprudence of certain regions in
the determination of the content of rules of international law with
universal reach. One ICJ judge expressed the concern that "if we
cite the European Court of Human Rights, somebody from Africa
might say, 'Why are they relying on this European court as the
authority?""' The judge pointed out, however, that in the Wall
case the ICJ did cite the United Nations Committee on Human
100. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14, 2002).
101. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 120-121.
102. Id. at 121.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Rights. "And there we had no problem because it is a UN body,
thus representative of the world, not a particular region.""°
Regional courts, on the other hand, do not seem to have any
qualms considering and quoting "universal" courts.
Relying on the jurisprudence of national courts seems to be
more problematic. Much like the case of international rulings, they
are just a documentary source that can be used to provide
evidence of a rule generated by one of the primary sources. Yet,
their impact on substantive international law is limited by several
factors.
Domestic courts rarely pronounce themselves on rules of
international law. They are rather a more useful source when it
comes to searching for general principles of law. Besides, they
seem to be considered a last resort, to be looked at only when
international sources do not help. "National case law will come
into play mostly when international sources don't give an answer,"
one judge explained."
For example, when there is a matter of what is impartiality,
there is no need to go to a Canadian or German supreme court
and find out what impartiality is when you have established case
law at the global and regional level. So it becomes more
subsidiary. But when it comes to, say, the question of a rather
procedural issue that has never been dealt with in human rights
case law, and which is very criminal law-oriented, then, why not
look at the national level and try to distill, to find out what is
the common denominator here, or what is the best solution,
even if it is not the common denominator? '°7
Attitude towards national case law varies from court to court,
and from judge to judge. The civil law/common law divide might
play a role in this variation. The Special Court for Sierra Leone,
for example, felt free to draw upon the decision of the British
House of Lords regarding Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet,
when considering matters of immunity.1" Similarly, it referred to
both U.S. and British decisions in a case that came before the
appeals chamber regarding judicial independence. "We go
105. Id.
106. Id. at 122.
107. Id.
108. Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 99.
109. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence), (Appeals
Chamber, Mar. 13, 2004).
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wherever we can find a suitable decision with principles that we
agree with," said one SCSL judge.
Sometimes where possible, where it's relevant, we go to the
jurisprudence of civil law courts. We don't use civil law doctrine
and jurisprudence much because, even within the civil law,
there's not the degree of harmony that people thought. German
civil law is different from the French civil law. And there is so
much variation and if you are not a civil lawyer, you do have to
leave that side alone. But where we et a clear pronouncement
which we understand, then we use it.
Other courts and judges are much more cautious. For
instance, the European Court of Justice rarely cites national
judgments. One judge explained that his colleagues do sometimes
look to the U.S. Supreme Court on matters such as antitrust law or
questions of discrimination, but,
[M]aking the direct acknowledgement could be politically
awkward or undesirable. If you do that, then you should be, in
principle, open to do that also with, say, the Supreme Court of
Somalia. You sort of open up something. We wouldn't
necessarily like to have a practice where we would only cite the
U.S. Supreme Court but no other national courts, and it also
has to be noted that we don't cite our own national courts
either, except of course when they ask us for preliminary
rulings. That you can't avoid, but otherwise we wouldn't cite
national courts."'
As a judge on the court commonly recognized to be at the top of
the pecking order, ICJ judge Thomas Buergenthal is perhaps
exceptional in how he views the sharing of jurisprudence. His
experience with other international courts, and his openness to
having a dialogue with other international judges, is reflected in his
knowledge and recognition of the value of the jurisprudence of
other courts, both international and domestic:
Contrary to what one would think, we at the ICJ do read
decisions of other courts that bear on what we are doing. And
even though we don't cite them-I've written and said we
should cite them, but we don't cite them-we do read them, and
we take different views into account when they are relevant.
The same is true of important national court decisions. The
argument for not citing other court decisions or academic
110. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 122.
111. Id.
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writing is that it avoids criticism that we are influenced by the
views of one or the other region of the world. There is always
the question, for example, that if we cited the European Court
of Human Rights, somebody from Africa or Asia might say,
"Why are they only relying on this European Court of Human
Rights as the authority?" We don't cite authors because [people
would] say, "How come you cited X and you didn't cite Y?" On
the Inter-American Court, we did cite the ICJ and we cited the
European Court of Human Rights, and initially we even cited
academic authorities. Eventually, though, we decided not to cite
academic authorities in order to avoid criticism from a variety
of quarters. But in my opinion there is no good reason for not
citing the judgments of other international courts.''
2
VI. SOLOISTS IN THE CHOIR
International courts are collegial bodies, and their decisions
are taken by majority. But, at the same time, courts are composed
of remarkable individuals with well-developed ideas, an awareness
of their own values, and, very often, pride. Formation of
consensus, and the dialectics of the deliberation room, might pose
a challenge to men and women used to being the voice of
authority.
There is no uniform practice regarding whether judges are
allowed to express publicly their disagreement with their court's
judgment or to explain individually their own legal reasoning.1 '3
While most of the thirteen major international courts permit
dissenting and individual opinions and declarations, the European
Court of Justice, with its large caseload and extensive impact and
influence, is one exception to this allowance."' At the WTO,
Appellate Body dissents are discouraged, but not forbidden, and
the practice in this regard is in a state of flux."'
112. Buergenthal Interview, supra note 21.
113. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 123.
114. The EFTA Court also does not permit dissents. See Carl Baudenbacher,
Judicialization: Can the European Model be Exported to Other Parts of the World?, 39
TEX. INT'L L.J. 381, 384 (2004) (stating that "[t]he main argument against introducing a
dissenting opinion system in the Community courts and the EFTA Court is the fear that
dissenting judges could be exposed to pressures by governments and their chances to be
reappointed could be placed at risk").
115. John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, in FROM
GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
71 (2000). ("There is no indication of particular authorship of any part of an Appellate
Body report and no provision for dissenting opinions."). A recent WTO AB decision,
however, may suggest that this is changing. In the Asbestos case, one of the panelists
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The issue of dissenting and individual opinions is one where
the rift between common law and civil law traditions is most
evident. The concept of entitling members of a collegiate judicial
body to give their personal opinions on the legal questions
presented is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, where the
judgment is conceived as the sum of the decisions of the individual
judges. "6 Conversely, the traditional civil law stance on the issue is
that a court is a uniform entity taking decisions by a majority that
remains anonymous after deliberating in camera."' One of the
reasons why the ECJ (and its twin, the EFIA Court) does not
allow opinions is believed to be that the founding members of the
European Community, which also created the cQurt, were all
countries of civil law tradition.''"8
Judges are divided on the merits of formal individual
opinions. In the case of concurring individual opinions, it is argued
that they enrich the judgment because, having been usually drafted
by a single judge, they show a higher degree of inner logic and
consistency than the majority opinion. In the case of dissenting
opinions, by letting dissenters go their way, the judgment of the
majority looks less like a patchwork of various opinions and a
compromise solution. Dissenting opinions may also help the
defeated party accept the verdict because they signal that the court
gave full consideration to the arguments presented. Pragmatically,
in courts that do not routinely operate in chambers, and where
cases are decided by groups of ten judges or more, judges argue
that opinions might be the only alternative to impossibly
protracted deliberations. As a president of a court admitted, "We
try to avoid dissent, but sometimes it's very difficult to do that, and
entirely time consuming, so it's better to have a dissent
sometimes. '"9
Some argue that judges are human beings and thus are
entitled to their individual freedom of speech. Opinions are an
essential safeguard of judicial independence and ensure greater
transparency and accountability. They allow judges the
wrote a concurring opinion, changing the long-standing practice to write unanimous
opinions. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), 40 .L.M. 1193.
116. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 123.
117. Id.
118. E.g., France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
119. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 124.
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opportunity to explain their votes and thus prevent speculation
and erroneous attribution, particularly when the bench taking the
decision is made of a few judges. In the case of the WTO
Appellate Body, where they are discouraged but not forbidden,
the result is a compromise whereby dissents are included in
judgments but are not attributed."' Yet, since decisions are taken
by a chamber of three members, usually everyone involved knows
who has authored the opinion. A member of the EFTA Court,
where dissenting opinions are not allowed and, likewise, there are
only three judges to decide cases, voiced his unease: "I think that
we should be more honest and introduce a dissenting opinion
system, particularly in a court of three, since rumors are going
around. We would be much more protected by a dissenting
opinion system. Then dissents would be official. Otherwise, they
are just floating around.' 2'
Judges critical of dissenting and separate opinions argue that,
far from ensuring independence, they might actually undermine it,
particularly in those courts where judges can be re-elected or
reappointed. This carries special force at the ECJ, where there is
no real competition between states to get their nominees elected,
so states de facto decide who their judges will be. Collective
judgments, in other words, allow judges more freedom, because
their individual role in the decision is hidden from public view.
Dissenting opinions would expose judges to the scrutiny of their
governments. An ECJ judge observed that
[B]ecause no opinions are allowed, and it is not said who voted
in favor or against, there is no way in which a government
would know which way a judge voted on something or another.
By the same token, the advantage of not having dissenting
opinions is that there is no opportunity for a judge to signal to
the boys back home, "Look what a good boy am I.,122
Allowing opinions places judges in a series of ethical
dilemmas, as another ECJ judge explained:
You would have the situation where judges start writing
opinions before their mandate expires or before they are asked
to resign. Whatever you do then is wrong: if you go against the
government because now you are just doing it in order to show
120. Jackson, supra note 115.
121. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 124.
122. Id.
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that you're independent. And if you go for the government, it's
because you want to be reappointed. It opens up all these sorts
of nasty speculations.'23
Critics of opinions also argue that dissents, or alternate bases
for reasoning, weaken the authority of a court. At the WTO,
where the Appellate Body is composed of three-person divisions,
one member asks, "What's the authority of the decision which is
supported by only two?"'24 Manifest dissent jeopardizes the
uniform interpretation of the law. In international criminal
tribunals, separate or dissenting opinions have the danger of
undermining the perception that the accused has been found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. In other contexts, dissents might stir and
provide fuel to internal conflicts between institutions and organs
and between states and institutions, an anathema particularly for
the building of the European federalist project.
This is also why the ECJ, unlike all other international courts,
has advocates general. They are full members of the court, but
they are not judges and they do not take part in the court's
deliberations.'25 Their role is to give the court, as complete
independents, a reasoned opinion on the pending case, weighing
pros and cons and the likely impact of the.judgment on the overall
legal system. It is a sort of "institutionalized opinion," one that
comes from someone close enough to the court to compensate for
the fact that opinions are not allowed at the ECJ, but separate
enough not to undermine the court.'26
General debate about the advantages and disadvantages of
opinions aside, everyone agrees that the use or misuse of opinions
is largely a matter of an individual's culture and background, self-
discipline, and the capacity of the president of the court to
mediate. As one judge puts it, "It's a question of disposition. You
have to have the discipline not to do that as a breaking exercise.
Your colleagues rapidly know if you are going for the common
good and try to polish things up and get it a bit better. 127 Another
judge echoes those words: "It shouldn't be an avenue for you to
portray yourself, or indulge your ego. It's such a disservice to the
123. Id. at 125.
124. Id.
125. See generally K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1994).
126. Id.
127. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 125.
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people who, put you there.' '128 A judge of the ICJ elaborated on
good uses and bad uses of opinions:
The purpose of the opinion is not to criticize a judgment; it's to
let your opinion be known, which is not exactly the same thing.
There are good uses and not-so good uses. For instance, in the
Kosovo cases,' a majority of the court-a slight majority-
decided that there was no jurisdiction because Yugoslavia was
not a member of the United Nations at that time. However,
there was a strong minority thinking that there was no
jurisdiction for quite different reasons. I think it was quite
justified in this case to make an opinion because these might• • 131
have an impact on the Bosnia-Herzegovina case we have
132now.
Unsurprisingly, academics-turned-judges have a particularly bad
reputation when it comes to their capacity for team play and for
keeping the purpose of the exercise well in focus.
No matter how hard a court tries to find a common ground
and no matter how skilled and patient a president might be,
certain personalities simply cannot be corralled. Shigeru Oda, the
former Japanese judge of the ICJ, has probably taken advantage of
the possibility of speaking his mind the most.13 In twenty-six years
at the ICJ (1977-2003), he authored no fewer than fifteen
declarations, twenty-three separate opinions, and fifteen dissenting
opinions. Others, like the Sri Lankan Christopher Weeramantry,
will probably go down in the history of the court as the author of
the lengthiest opinions, often exceeding the length of the judgment
itself and resembling veritable treatises of international law in
128. Id.
129. Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.; Serb. & Mont. v. Can.; Serb.
& Mont. v. Fr.; Serb. & Mont. v. F.R.G.; Serb. & Mont. v. Italy; Serb. & Mont. v. Neth.;
Serb. & Mont. v. Port.; Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), 2004 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 15).
130. Joint Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, Legality of the Use of Force
(Preliminary Objections) (Serb. & Mont. v. Fr.), 2004 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 15).
131. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. No. 91 (Feb. 26).
132. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 125.
133. See generally SHIGERU ODA, EDWARD MCWHINNEY & MARIKO KAWANO,
JUDGE SHIGERU ODA AND THE PATH TO JUDICIAL WISDOM: OPINIONS
(DECLARATIONS, SEPARATE OPINIONS, DISSENTING OPINIONS) ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 1993-2003 (2006).
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their own right." Recalling the seminal Tadi6 case, decided by the
ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber, a judge noted, "There was even
one judge, the Pakistani judge, who said, 'I write my own
judgment.' And he wrote the separate opinion, which was in
reality a veritable separate judgment. He just didn't participate!""'9
All together, opinions of judges of international courts form a
very bulky corpus. Numbers at the ICJ alone are staggering: in
over sixty years of activity, it has accumulated 1017 opinions (262
declarations, 406 separate opinions, 349 dissenting opinions) in
slightly more than one hundred cases. 3' Whether concurring or
dissenting, opinions do have a decided, but unquantifiable impact
on international law. First, international law is shaped by multiple
factors that are difficult to unbundle. Second, the exact value of
subsidiary sources in the shaping of international law is quite
unclear. Third, although parties do frequently cite opinions, they
are rarely expressly cited in decisions of international courts
themselves, even where that might have been useful or
appropriate. Be that as it may, there are numerous examples in
international legal scholarship, especially that of the eldest of
standing international courts, the World Court, 7 that have altered
the course of international law or the subsequent development of
the given court's case law. 3'
At one extreme, one might say that opinions are merely equal
to the writings of the most distinguished scholars of international
law. That is to say, they are just another subsidiary source that can
be examined when determining the content of the law as
established by the primary sources.3 9 At the other extreme, one
134. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25);
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
135. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 126.
136. Figures as of November 15, 2005. Hofmann & Laubner, Article 57, in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1209 (Andreas
Zimmermann ed., 2006).
137. This term refers collectively to the Permanent Court of International Justice and
its successor institution, the International Court of Justice.
138. See, e.g., LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27); Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 226; Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory: Opinion and Reaction, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 119 (2006);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2,1998).
139. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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might say that their practical value approximates that of decisions
of a whole court, particularly when well-written and reasoned.
Regardless, it seems that if law-making by international courts is
not readily accepted, law by a single judge should arguably be
considered even more problematic. The emergence of a global
judicial community, however, is creating a legal environment that
tends to curtail grandstanding.
VII. PUBLIC PRESSURES
The legitimacy of international courts does not rest solely,
however, on the value and unanimity of their judgments. The
courts also need the support and visibility that can be created
through the embrace of public opinion in key regions and around
the world. Although the ideal image of judges and their courts
shows them operating in seclusion from the outside world, immune
from political influence or public pressure, international courts are
institutions born of politics and often beholden to the public. They
are subjected to particularly close scrutiny-from member states,
the press, and the public at large-and this makes for unique
challenges to their ability both to function independently and to
feel the full benefit of judicial community-building.
Insulation from public opinion is, in some ways, the very
essence of the work of the judge, whose first duty is to the law
rather than to an electorate. In practice, judicial seclusion from
public pressure has proved less than perfect. In the United States,
for example, there have been numerous attempts by legislatures
and other political bodies to coerce judges to be more responsive
to majority sentiment, and the public examinations of U.S.
Supreme Court candidates have become a regular ritual of
political scrutiny. '° Nevertheless, direct attempts to influence
140. For example, the recent appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court to fill vacancies
left by Sandra Day O'Connor and William Rehnquist created heated debate. Harriet
Miers went so far as to withdraw herself as a nominee after being subjected to rigorous
scrutiny over her politics and judicial qualifications. For discussion of the recent
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, see Michael A. Fletcher and Charles Babington,
Miers, Under Fire From Right Withdrawn as Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005,
at Al; David Stout and Timothy Williams, Miers Ends Supreme Court Bid After Failing to
Win Support, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/lI27/
politics/politicsspeciall/27cnd-scotus.html; Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for
Ideological Battle, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al; Elisabeth Bumiller and Carl Hulse,
Bush Picks Appeals Court Judge to Succeed O'Connor on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2005, at Al. For a recent article touching on U.S. attitudes towards international courts,
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judges represent clear violations of a longstanding traditional
standard of detachment.
It could be argued that in some ways the international courts
have the opposite problem. To the extent that their long-term
success depends on their credibility as international institutions,
these courts need public attention. They need to establish their
relevance, their integrity, and their effectiveness. To do so, they
need to be seen and heard, not just by the legal and diplomatic
communities, but also by a broad cross-section of the citizenry of
the countries that support them. Legal scholars Lawrence Helfer
and Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued that international courts
ignore this larger constituency at their peril.'4' They point out that
"individuals and their lawyers, voluntary associations, and
nongovernmental organizations are ultimately the users and
consumers of judicial rulings," and that
[A]n appreciation of the relationship between these social
actors and the institutions of state government opens the door
to deploying them as forces for expanding the power and
influence of international tribunals. Just as an international
tribunal may align its case law with the independent incentives
facing some national courts, it can also address itself to the
individuals and groups who are likely to be the ultimate
beneficiaries of the enforcement of international norms and
instruments."'
Without that visibility, the courts run the risk of indifference,
leading inexorably to a drop in the support and cooperation from
states that are so vital to their success.
The need for public recognition puts international judges in
an awkward position. How can they solicit public attention without
creating public pressures for particular outcomes? Conscious of
the importance of their insulation from public opinion, judges have
traditionally been reluctant to speak publicly about their cases,
preferring to let the texts of their judgments speak for themselves.
Yet, judgments are legal documents, precise enough to follow the
dictates of the law, parsed by lawyers, but usually inaccessible to
those outside the profession. How far should international judges
see Jose Alvarez, Judicialization and Its Discontents, THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (Jan. 31,
2008), http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/pres080131.html.
141. Heifer and Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
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go in making conscious efforts to reach a broader audience? What
dangers to their independence and effectiveness might arise in
making such efforts?
Some members of the international bench maintain
traditional judicial caution about public statements. "As a matter
of principle, personally, I don't talk to the press," said one judge
who has served as a court president. "But if the head of the public
affairs section says I should talk, then I talk.' '14 Others prefer to let
the official documents speak for themselves, except in unusual
circumstances. "Obviously, for a judge who decided a case,
especially as one of several judges, to interpret judicial decisions to
the media would seldom be wise, and in certain circumstances
might be inappropriate," said one judge.'" "But in case of
egregious error or gross misrepresentation by the media, a
correction by the judge cannot be entirely excluded. Helping
journalists report notable judicial decisions accurately so that the
public becomes better informed increases appreciation of the
importance of our work and is a legitimate public relations
function.' ' 15 One court president is willing to reach out to specific
constituencies, such as ministers of state or national judges, and he
conceded that press releases by themselves are "obviously not
enough." Nevertheless, he said that "it would be dangerous for the
courts through the president to try to explain the judgment.'
46
A growing number, however, particularly from the criminal
courts, see the dangers, but still believe that the courts must be
more proactive in establishing strong relationships with the media.
"We really need to create closer links with the media to inform
them," said one judge, "because it's the only way for the people to
know what's going on here.' ' 147 By maintaining a judicial silence,
warned another judge, courts run the risk of letting interested
parties "own" the story.'4 "There should be a much greater
attempt to explain the purpose of the court and to keep the public
apprised," she argued. Otherwise, the court's work is interpreted
either by inexperienced members of the press or by NGOs who
143. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 171.
144. Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal
Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, no. 2, 369 (2005).
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have an interest in giving it their own spin.' 9 Another judge
recalled that in the early days of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, judges were prevented from making "any but the
blandest pronouncements" about cases before them."50 "Judgments
of international human rights courts that are not adequately
publicized are much easier for governments to disregard," he
explained.'
With greater efforts in public outreach come increased and
sometimes specific public expectations. These expectations are
clearest for the criminal courts, to the extent that those courts are
seen not as instruments of impartial justice but as mechanisms for
punishment or even revenge. "You know, they're all guilty
anyway," is how one judge characterized a commonly-held public
sentiment. "These are the people that in the international sphere
are pushing for convictions and long sentences. They get furious-
I'm overstating it-if you don't give a life sentence to everybody
that comes down. So there is a switch and the pressure is on to
convict by and large over there." ' 2 For judges with a human rights
background, this pressure comes with a considerable irony. Many
of them spent earlier parts of their careers protecting the rights of
defendants in national courts, holding military organizations, police
departments and justice systems accountable for their violations of
fairness and justice. Now, as judges on international criminal
courts, they can find themselves pressured by erstwhile colleagues
to give primary attention to the rights of victims, rather than those
in the dock.
The president of the International Criminal Court worried
that "expectations have always been extremely high" for the ICC.
"While the ICC will do everything it can to fulfill its role
effectively, it is simply not possible to meet all of the
expectations," he continued. "An accurate understanding of the
court is important to ensuring sustained, effective-and
necessary-support. This is why, when speaking about the court, I
explain not only its potential, but also the limitations of the court's
149. Id.
150. Thomas Buergenthal, Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 259, 278-79 (2005).
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jurisdiction, the complexity of situations in which it operates in the
field, and its dependence on external support ....
It is clear, then, that international courts depend upon the
press to disseminate information about their decisions and major
accomplishments. Without this publicity, the full impact of their
work in bringing about justice, and even reconciliation, cannot be
felt. At the same time, court staff members often feel that the
press does not report on their work accurately, and this can
ultimately harm the reputation of the institution. Navanethem
Pillay, formerly president of the ICTR and now a judge of the
ICC, spoke of a junior journalist who visited the tribunal while
there were no trials in session. This was subsequently reported as,
"These judges are doing nothing!" in a half dozen papers, without
any fact checking. A full account of the work of the tribunal is
available on the court website, provided and maintained by the
outreach office. "The public has access to it," said Pillay, "[b]ut the
media is not interested in it. You don't sell papers with that kind of
information. You need something sensational."'"
Non-governmental organizations may also play a key role in
intensifying media and public scrutiny. This is a role that
international judges consider a mixed blessing. One criminal court
judge called NGO involvement a "healthy development" because
activists call attention to "real burning issues" that judges, by habit
of professional detachment, tend to set aside. At the same time,
she argued that NGO involvement "really has to be controlled-
they mustn't come here to argue one side of the thing. We're not
[only] in the business of convictions.".. Another judge pointed out
that NGOs, by their nature, are maximalists: "[M]ost of them aim
at one hundred percent success and if they don't get that, then
there is something wrong.."' This passion means that they can be
of considerable assistance to the courts in providing advice and
information, but that their methods are sometimes at odds with the
judicial temperament of balance. When it comes to relations with
NGOs, "Dialogue, yes, but control, no," said one judge."7
The non-criminal courts, too, find themselves under pressure
to prove their relevance, and judges on these courts concede that
153. Id. (quoting Phillipe Kirsch).
154. Id. at 45. From an interview recorded on April 5, 2005 in the Hague.
155. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 172.
156. Id.
157. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
they keep one eye on public concerns. At the International Court
of Justice, for example, one judge pointed out that the court is
under pressure to issue decisions backed by a large majority in
politically sensitive cases such as territory disputes, "where having
a pretty united bench is thought pretty important to stop the
fighting on the ground."' " Even though the ICJ's presidents have
traditionally maintained considerable reserve, the court as an
institution has taken a series of steps to better accommodate the
press, including renovations to the press room, increased staff, and
video coverage of proceedings. Despite these developments, it is
still difficult to get attention for the ICJ's work: "The truth of the
matter is that the press at the moment thinks that international
crimes are sexy, but that law that's not criminal is boring.
1 59
Another ICJ judge noted that states parties themselves are adept
at using the media for their own ends." For the state's
representatives, sometimes the outcome of the court's decision is
secondary to the opportunity to prove to the domestic public that
they have defended their country's interests before an
international institution.16 '
Regional courts like those in Europe face the challenge of
communicating a continental perspective through domestic media
that inevitably filter the courts' work through their national self-
interest.'62 "Most of our decisions are decisions where [the] direct
and immediate impact is on a small concentrated group of people,"
said one judge on the European Court of Justice.'63 That impact is
usually negative. According to this judge, one example of this
dynamic is "opening a national market, requiring a member state
no longer to give protection to its nationals regarding economic
support of the state. And instead the benefits are diffused through
all the other nationals of the European Union, for example. And
who is going to focus on this case? Well, the newspapers of the
state it is in and not the other ones. '' "6 In that situation,
[T]his means that we are a court whose individual decisions will
normally, because of its asymmetries of the situation of costs
158. Id. at 173.
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and benefits, tend to have a risk of lacking popular support. So
it is very important that we try to make people understand in
terms that our legitimacy comes from the system."'
The situation is aggravated because affected governments
speak readily to their own press, fanning the flames. In one case,
an ECJ judge reported, officials of a member state used the press
to threaten withholding financial support for the court if a
particular judgment was unfavorable; such a use of the media, he
said, "is an illegitimate form of pressure."'
On occasion, the international courts feel an obligation to
bend their rules and procedures in the face of national or
international opinion. "Sometimes," said a member of the
International Court of Justice, "you're quite convinced that the
law requires X, but if dreadful things are going on in a particular
country, you know, then there is the discussion of, how will the
world see it if we say we can't hear this, or that they've not
complied," or if there are "procedures" that interfere with a case
being heard. 7 The judge cited the case involving the wall between
Israel and the Palestinian territories. Even though "there was no
basis" in the court's usual procedure for allowing a non-state
entity-the Palestinians-to appear as a party, "yet every single
one of us thought-'they've just got to be here.""' Part of this is a
calculated effort on the part of the courts to prove their relevance
on matters of import. One WTO Appellate Body member
bemoaned the fact that laymen fail to distinguish between the
WTO as an organization and the dispute settlement mechanism,
where concerns about the institutional priorities can be aired. The
public tends to believe, he argued, that the appellate body itself "is
there to further globalization, to serve the interests of the
multinationals, to serve the big powers against the small.'. 9
Outsiders have the opportunity, he said, to "master the
machinery" and further their interests within the system by using
the dispute settlement mechanism, "rather than throwing stones
from the outside.',
70
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Defenders of the ideal of the secluded judge will view the
increasing openness of the international courts to the media and
the public as a loss for judicial integrity. Nevertheless, there is
every reason to come to the opposite conclusion. In a world where
public scrutiny of failure is inevitable and public attention to
success is scant, the courts as institutions must seize every
opportunity to explain their work from the viewpoint of their
institutional concerns. This may present some ethical challenges
for judges as individual professionals, but for the courts as
institutions, cautious self-promotion is vital to the exercise of their
function. They must participate in the process of shaping realistic
perceptions of their work. If they do not, they become more
vulnerable to the pressure of uninformed, self-interested public
expectations. International courts do not operate, in splendid
isolation from political actors and the larger public, and to pretend
that they do simply damages the prospects for effective justice. In
this sense, the emerging global judicial community must cautiously
build connections to broader networks as its members seek to
strengthen their work and their institutions.
VIII. "CORPORATE SOLIDARITY"
Even while it is extending its reach, a more coherent judicial
community also has the potential for insularity. In most
international courts, judges are themselves responsible for
maintaining the integrity of their institutions, and for overseeing
the procedures for disciplining their colleagues in cases of breaches
of law or ethics. 1' In these situations, there lurks the danger that
international judges may put loyalty to the emerging community
ahead of their responsibilities to their institutions.
Every international court specifies a procedure for removing
a judge for egregious misconduct. Most frequently, the court's
statute provides that the judges of a court may remove one of their
peers from the bench if they decide unanimously that he or she has
not lived up to the requirements of service.'72 The statutes provide
broad flexibility for making that decision; they do not lay out a
series of precise circumstances under which judges can or should
171. See TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4 at 193-207.
172. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 139, at art. 18.
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remove their fellows. 73 It is obvious, however, that it would take an
extraordinary situation-one where the misconduct was flagrant
and beyond doubt-for all of the other judges on a court to agree
to such drastic action. No judge has ever been removed "for
cause" from an international court or tribunal."'
Most misconduct, however, falls far short of the kind of
blatant greed or incompetence that would lead to removal, and the
statutes provide little guidance for what to do in situations that call
for less dramatic corrective action. There are procedures for
assessing the necessity for disqualification from individual cases in
instances when judges do not recuse themselves.7 ' But beyond
recusal, the courts have precious few mechanisms for regulating
the behavior of judges, especially in the harder-to-measure areas
that fall under the category of "professional ethics.' 76
In the absence of formal mechanisms for monitoring the
performance of judges, the president of the court plays an
important role. In practice, court presidents tend to have little
actual authority over their fellow judges, but the president is the
chief administrator of the judges' business, and disciplinary
matters end up in his domain."' As in a national court, said one
court president, "the president normally has no disciplinary
powers over his judges so you're trying to reason with the judges
and some will at once accept that.' 78 The president may find
himself trying to convince a judge to recuse himself in a particular
case, rather than be disqualified by his peers. Alternatively, he
may try to persuade a judge to tone down.the recriminations of his
colleagues in the draft text of a dissenting opinion or he may have
to take a judge aside and urge him not to speak so openly about
173. See, e.g., id. See also ICJ Rules of Court, art. 6, (1978, amended 2005), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0.
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disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.").
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the court's business to the media. "It's much more pleasant to do
the work if you have a nice climate .... I think it enhances the
credibility of the court to the outside world if you prevent clashes
from being made public. 179 His power, though, is limited. "If that
happened when [judges were calling] each other fools and idiots
and irresponsible or non-patriotic and all the rest I would certainly
come in and say, 'You can't do that,'. but I can't guarantee, I have
no veto right or disciplinary powers.'. 8 Presidents also have the
option of using back-door political channels to put pressure on
under-performing colleagues. The president of a UN court, one
judge pointed out, could theoretically urge the Secretary General
to speak quietly to the government of a bad judge, putting
pressure on him to resign.'8' It is not a perfect method, the judge
conceded, but "there may be no other way to cure it.' 82
These examples suggest how large a premium many judges
place on keeping disciplinary matters internal and quiet. This is a
matter not only of shielding individual colleagues from the glare of
the public spotlight but also of protecting the reputations of the
institutions. If maintaining credibility takes precedence over
uprooting misconduct, though, the integrity of the courts is bound
to suffer.As in domestic courts, the accountability of the international
judiciary is largely a matter of conscience and collegiality.
"'Accountable to God,' is an old-fashioned way of putting it," said
one judge."' He does not even see himself as accountable, exactly,
to fellow judges. "I have to live with my colleagues," he said, "and
it is a feature one prefers, to be well thought of by one's colleagues
rather than to be thought a pain in the neck."'' Another judge
emphasized the power of pride: "If you're associated with
something, you want it to be good," she said.'85 "You don't want it
to be some kind of sloppy mess kind of thing. And in that sense
that's really the accountability kind of thing."'8 8 Another put it
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even more succinctly: "There is no check from the outside; it's
only from the inside. '87
Even if the judges act individually with integrity and dignity,
the question remains whether the courts can collectively fail the
test of character. We tend to think of ethics in- terms of personal
decision-making, overlooking the critical aspect of collective
responsibility within organizations. Each international court
develops its own judicial culture. If we are going to examine
judicial ethics and character in the broadest sense, we need to ask
whether the judicial culture of international courts nurtures
integrity and fairness.
Like any organization, the greatest threats to organizational
integrity lie in the inherent tendency towards self-protection.
Internal matters of privilege, power, and advancement within the
system create alliances and forces that resist change and
marginalize those who bring new methods and ideas.... "I was
surprised at the amount of politics," said one criminal court judge,
speaking of the internal decision-making process of the court.'9°
The lack of clear rules regarding the assignment of cases, the
intricacies of elections for the officers of the court, the assignment
of judges to particular chambers-these internal matters
contribute to a sense of expectation that individual judges should
stay in line.'9' This judge charged that this has the potential for
impact on actual decisions because those who disagree publicly
with the court's leadership can be punished through administrative
procedures. "So all this means that the judges are not independent,
but not because of external pressure, but because of internal
anxiety."...
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 20-21 (1997) (exploring tensions between
personal beliefs and professional norms).
189. Cherie Booth & Philippe Sands, Comment, Keep Politics Out of the Global
Courts, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 13, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/
Article/0,4273,4221020,00.html.
190. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 206 (citing a judge on condition
of anonymity).
191. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 176.
192. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 206 (citing a judge on condition
of anonymity).
467
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
This perception suggests a high risk of what one former
international judge called "corporate solidarity."9 ' Gil Carlos
Rodrfguez Iglesias, who served as a judge on both the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights,
emphasized that "a judge's personal responsibility should be
determined only by a judicial body," but he worried that "the need
for judicial independence is hard to reconcile with the creation of a
system for ensuring responsibility." 94  Corporate solidarity,
Rodrfguez argued, arises in any situation where peers sit in
judgment on one another.'95 Individuals have a natural interest in
withholding judgment of their peers, because of bonds of
collegiality, because of concerns for the public face of the
institution, and because they wish mild treatment for themselves in
return.96 The tendency reflects a potential shortcoming of the
"epistemic community" of judges that has been remarked upon
previously. 7 Rodrfguez does not offer a practical solution to the
tension between independence and accountability-indeed, he
seems to suggest that the problem may not be resolvable. An open
discussion of the problem, he seems to feel, may itself be a form of
raising the standards of responsibility.'98
There are, of course, some good reasons for the relative
weakness of the system of accountability for international judges.
Strong methods of oversight by external monitors are vulnerable
to abuse and raise the specter of interference with judicial
independence.9 ' Better, perhaps, to run the risk of misconduct by
an occasional "bad apple" than to create structures where
powerful players can interfere with judicial decision-making under
the guise of improving professional standards. In practice, the
system seems to work reasonably well; judicial misconduct appears
to be relatively infrequent, and it has not, to date, substantially
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damaged the Work of any of the international courts. 2' ° But the
weak mechanisms of accountability leave the courts vulnerable in
two important respects. First, the climate of self-regulation
reinforces the arguments of critics who portray international
judges as free-floating individuals whose standards of justice are at
odds with individual nations and citizens. Second, without stronger
processes in place, international courts may be vulnerable to a
major scandal whose damage would be widespread.
IX. THE FUTURE OF THE "INVISIBLE COLLEGE"
As we have seen, the community of international judges is
partly a matter of common patterns of education, partly a matter
of common professional experiences in the world of law, academia,
and diplomacy, and partly a matter of increased opportunities for
meaningful interaction and dialogue among the various courts.
There was once a time when the "invisible college" of
international judges consisted of a small band of men, principally
Europeans, clustered tightly in the Hague."' Today's more
extensive network has much more diversity in terms of geography,
race, and gender, but the common bonds across space and time
and the universal understanding of the judicial function often
minimize those differences. 2 Training in a relatively small number
of key universities ensures significant commonalities in the legal
mindset of international judges, shaping attitudes and
philosophies. The career paths for many international judges
overlap and intersect in international courtrooms and academic
and diplomatic conferences, allowing personal relationships to
develop that can carry over to the bench. A growing number of
judicial conferences have created new opportunities for previously
scattered international judges to sit together and compare ideas
about such topics as the use of precedent, independence and
accountability, the writing of judgments, and the problems of
enforcement.
The development of this community has had a profound
effect on the work and role of international judges. The major
differences in legal method and practice between the civil law and
200. TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 4, at 207.
201. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 217,222 (1977).
202. Id. at 223.
469
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
common law systems appear to pose challenges for international
courts, but judges insist that a fidelity to basic principles developed
through their networks tends to minimize this conflict. 3 The
community has also created important restraints on the threat of
fragmentation in the international legal system as judges read and
take into consideration the judgments of their peers on other
courts, even if they do not always cite or rely upon them.2" In the
criminal field, men and women with experience in the ad hoc
tribinals are now playing a key part in the development of the
permanent International Criminal Court, bringing rules, practices,
and procedures with them. International judges cannot rely for
authority and consistency on an extensive body of history,
tradition, and documents, as can their counterparts in the strongest
national systems; the "invisible college" of international judges
goes a long way towards mitigating the relative paucity of those
crucial bulwarks. In many ways it appears that the international
community of judges both takes advantage of and contributes to
trends towards globalization by building on communication
networks and by making legal interpretations thatbreak down
barriers between nations and peoples.
Two important cautions, however, should be heeded
regarding the direction and development of this community. First,
we should be careful not to exaggerate its closeness and its
consistency. The growing "epistemic community" of judges may
help close some anticipated gaps, like the differences between civil
law and common law, but other breaches remain. One such breach
has to do with how much judges and courts should rely explicitly
on dialogue and community itself. For example, when it comes to
how much international courts should cite one another's
judgments, and who should cite whom, there is considerable
disagreement." Perhaps more importantly, the veneer of
cosmopolitanism cannot entirely hide the presence of national
perspectives on the international bench, as political divides subtly,
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but inevitably intrude (just as they do in domestic jurisdictions)
into judicial practice and decision-making.
26
The second and more important caution is that the
development of a judicial community could nurture stagnation as
easily as vitality. To the extent that international courts
increasingly represent a collection of men and women who have
trained and worked in similar institutions, thinking and practices
can become ossified, and the pace of change and innovation can
decelerate. As we have seen, some people who work for judges in
international courts fear that this has happened to some extent
already, as judges wrap themselves in a mantle of infallibility that
comes with the privileges of office. Others fear that the
development of a global community threatens to institute an
artificial construct of global values that will blur or mask healthy
differences of national or local perspective. As judges and courts
become more intertwined, there is always the risk that individual
judges will be more likely to put the interests of their prerogatives
and institutions ahead of larger considerations of justice.
It seems likely that the international judicial network will
continue to grow and expand-at least on the surface. Yet, this
development will not lead inexorably towards a healthy
combination of coherence and innovation. Fifty years from now,
the "invisible college" of international judges is likely to be more
visible, but whether its impact will be superficial or profound
remains to be seen.
206. Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, supra note 201, at 218
("In observing that international lawyers are likely to reflect their value systems and meta-
juridical preferences, I do not mean to suggest that they will necessarily accept the
positions of their national states.").

